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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how prices set by multinational firms vary across arm's-length and related-party
customers. Comparing prices within firms, products, destination countries, modes of transport and
month, we find that the prices U.S. exporters set for their arm's-length customers are substantially
larger than the prices recorded for related-parties.  This price wedge is smaller for commodities than
for differentiated goods, is increasing in firm size and firm export share, and is greater for goods sent
to countries with lower corporate tax rates and higher tariffs. We also find that changes in exchange
rates have differential effects on arm's-length and related-party prices; an appreciation of the dollar
reduces the difference between the prices.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines how prices set by multinational ﬁrms vary across arm’s-length and
related-party customers. It takes advantage of a unique new dataset that tracks the population
of U.S. export transactions during the 1990s. Consistent with a model of transfer pricing
developed below, these data show that there is a large positive gap between ﬁrms’ internal and
external prices. The size of this price wedge varies systematically with product diﬀerentiation,
ﬁrms’ market power and destination-countries’ corporate tax rates and import tariﬀs.
U.S. exports are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of ﬁrms. The top 1
percent of exporters represent 0.03 percent of the total number of ﬁrms in the United States but
account for more than 80 percent of the value of exports and employ more than 11 percent of
all private-sector workers. Among large exporters, U.S.-based multinationals, i.e., U.S.-owned
multinationals or local aﬃliates of foreign-owned multinationals, are dominant, controlling more
than 90 percent of total U.S. exports.1 A substantial fraction of these exports — one third —
occur within the ﬁrm, i.e., between the U.S.-based multinational and a related party in a foreign
country.2
The prominence of multinational ﬁrms in international trade has stimulated a large body
of research attempting to explain what goods they produce, where they locate production and
how they respond to incentives and policies enacted by national and sub-national governments.
Their potential use of “transfer” pricing for related-party transactions has, in particular, drawn
widespread attention from practitioners as well as academics.3 Given the large volume of U.S.
and global trade that takes place within multinationals, the potential impact of transfer pricing is
substantial, having the ability to inﬂuence oﬃcial trade statistics, national accounts aggregates
and estimates of inﬂation and productivity growth via its eﬀect on import and export price
indexes.4
Multinational ﬁrms have both managerial and ﬁnancial motives for setting diﬀerent prices for
arm’s-length and related-party transactions. Managerial motives include establishing the proper
incentives for disparate divisions within a decentralized ﬁrm and avoiding “double marginaliza-
tion” in the presence of market power.5 Financial motivations encompass the minimization
of corporate tax and tariﬀ payments as well as the avoidance of foreign exchange controls or
other restrictions on cross-border capital movements. Because obtaining direct evidence on the
pricing behavior of multinationals is extremely diﬃcult, existing empirical studies generally rely
1U.S.-based multinationals that export account for 0.90 percent of all ﬁrms, 13 percent of exporting ﬁrms, and
employ 27 percent of U.S. workers. See Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) for these and other facts about U.S.
trading ﬁrms.
2As discussed below, “related-party” trade refers to trade between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries
as well as trade between U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies and their foreign aﬃliates. For exports, ﬁrms are
“related” if either party owns, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the other party (see Section 30.7(v) of
The Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations).
3Transfer pricing concerns have traditionally been a cross-border issue; however recent court cases in the U.K.
are threatening to impose the same restrictions on within-country intra-ﬁrm pricing as exist for cross-border
transactions. See the Economist (2005).
4U.S. import and export price indexes are currently constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics using prices
reported by ﬁrms in voluntary monthly surveys. To the extent that these prices reﬂect an unknown mixture of
arm’s-length and related-party transactions, they may fail to capture true movements in the U.S. terms of trade.
See, for example, Diewert et al. (2005) and Rangan and Lawrence (1993).
5“Double marginalization” is a variant of the vertical externality where the downstream ﬁrm does not take the
upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt into account when setting prices. See Tirole (1988).Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 3
upon indirect evidence or responses in a narrowly deﬁned industry.6
The data employed in this paper are derived from point-of-export customs documents track-
ing every U.S. international export transaction occurring between 1993 and 2000 inclusive. For
each export shipment that leaves the United States, these documents record the identity of the
exporter, the Harmonized System product classiﬁcation and date of shipment, the value and
quantity shipped, the destination country, the transport mode, and whether the transaction
takes place at “arm’s length” or between “related parties”. These data provide researchers the
ﬁrst opportunity to observe key features of multinational-ﬁrm activity. Our focus in this paper
is on the wedge between multinational ﬁrms’ arm’s-length and related-party prices (i.e., unit
values) and the extent to which this wedge varies with product and ﬁrm characteristics, market
structure and government policy.
We ﬁnd that export prices for intraﬁrm transactions are signiﬁcantly lower than prices for
the same good sent to an arm’s-length customer. After matching related-party sales by a ﬁrm
to arm’s-length sales by the same ﬁrm for the same product to the same country in the same
m o n t hu s i n gt h es a m em od eo ft r a n s po r t ,w eﬁnd that the average arm’s-length price is 43 percent
higher than the related-party price. Product characteristics are inﬂuential in determining this
gap. While the wedge for commodities (i.e., undiﬀerentiated goods) averages 8.8 percent, the
gap for diﬀerentiated goods is 66.7 percent. Firm and market attributes are also inﬂuential: the
diﬀerence between arm’s-length and related-party prices are higher for goods shipped by larger
ﬁrms, by ﬁrms with higher export shares, and by ﬁrms in product-country markets served by
fewer exporters.
Consistent with incentives to minimize taxation and import duties, we ﬁnd that the wedge
between arm’s-length and related-party prices is negatively associated with destination-country
corporate tax rates and positively associated with destination-country import tariﬀs. For each
one percentage point reduction in the foreign tax rate we ﬁnd an increase in the price wedge
of 0.56 to 0.66 percent. A one percentage point increase in the foreign customs duty increases
the price wedge by 0.56 to 0.60 percent. These results show that multinational ﬁrms make
substantial price adjustments to variation in country tax and tariﬀ rates. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that pricing responses to tax rate diﬀerences across countries led to $5.5
billion in lower U.S. corporate tax revenues and a $15 billion increase in the merchandise trade
deﬁcit in 2004.
We also examine the role of exchange rates in multinational pricing. Though a large literature
is devoted to analyzing the interaction of ﬁrm market power and exchange rate movements, it
largely ignores issues of transfer pricing.7 Here, we ﬁnd that the price gap between ﬁrms’ arm’s-
length and related-party prices varies negatively with countries’ real exchange rates, suggesting
that multinationals adjust their arm’s-length and related-party prices asymmetrically in response
to exchange rate shocks.8 Coeﬃcient estimates imply that a ten percent appreciation of the
dollar against the destination currency reduces the price gap by approximately 2 percent.
The relatively large wedge we ﬁnd between ﬁrms arm’s-length and related-party prices has
intriguing implications for how multinational performance should be evaluated. Existing com-
parison of multinationals with purely domestic ﬁrms generally ﬁnd that they are larger, more
6For exceptions, see the discussion of Lall (1973), Swenson (2001) and Clausing (2003) in the next section.
7See, for example, the survey by Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
8Rangan and Lawrence (1993) argue that the U.S. export price index deviates insuﬃciently from the U.S.
wholesale price index in the presence of exchange rate movements because it is biased towards sampling ﬁrms’
intraﬁrm prices. To the extent that exchange-rate driven changes in the arm’s length price wedge are due to
relatively large adjustments in ﬁrms’ arm’s length prices, our results provide support for this argument.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 4
innovative, exhibit higher productivity, pay higher wages and employ greater numbers of skilled
or educated workers.9 Few, if any, of these studies, however, contemplate the inﬂuence of transfer
pricing, a potentially important omission given that aﬃliates’ ability to purchase lower-priced
intermediate inputs from overseas parents may inﬂuence all of these measures of performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We start by brieﬂy surveying the large
existing literature on transfer pricing. In Section 3, we develop a theoretical framework to
highlight the product, ﬁrm, and country attributes that potentially inﬂuence the gap between
ﬁrms’ arm’s-length and related-party prices. Section 4 describes the dataset and Section 5
outlines how we compare arm’s-length and related-party prices empirically. We present the
main empirical results in Sections 6, 7 and 8. Section 9 concludes.
2. Existing Research on Transfer Pricing
There are large theoretical and empirical literatures on transfer pricing by multinational
ﬁrms.10 Theoretical research considers two major topics: managerial and economic incentives in
multidivisional ﬁrms and tax minimization and compliance in cross-border transactions. Eden
(1998) develops a series of models to describe managerial as well as tax and tariﬀ eﬀects on
intraﬁrm prices when the ﬁrm sets a single transfer price.11 Capithorne (1971), Horst (1971),
Samuelson (1982), Halperin and Srinidhi (1987), and Harris and Sansing (1998) examine the
eﬀect of tax-rate diﬀerences on production and pricing when a single agent is responsible for intra-
company transactions. A set of more recent papers analyzes decentralization of the decision-
making process within the multinational ﬁrm. Hyde and Choe (2005) examine the eﬀects of
transfer pricing on economic incentives and tax compliance in a model where the domestic
division sets two transfer prices: one for managerial decision-making and the other for tax
compliance. Similarly, Baldenius et al. (2004) develop a model with two types of transfer prices
and consider the eﬀects of cost-based and market-based transfer pricing.12 The model we develop
below is a generalization of this two-price approach.
The empirical literature on transfer pricing focuses almost exclusively on the relationship
between corporate tax and import tariﬀ rates and multinational ﬁrms’ over- or under-invoicing in
international trade. Most of these studies address this question indirectly by examining whether
ﬁrms in relatively low-tax jurisdictions are more proﬁtable than ﬁrms in high-tax jurisdictions13
or whether economic activity varies across locations14. Hines (1997) provides a survey of this
literature, which typically ﬁnds a negative correlation between tax rates and ﬁrm proﬁtability.
To our knowledge none of the empirical papers consider the role of product characteristics or
ﬁrm market power in the transfer pricing decision.
9Doms and Jensen (1998) report signiﬁcantly higher productivity at plants owned by U.S. multinationals, a
fact used by Helpman et al. (2004) to motivate a model of exporting and multinationals. Aitken et al. (1996) and
many others report higher wages at foreign-owned plants. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) ﬁnd higher wages, higher
levels of education and more inputs per worker in foreign-owned plants in Indonesia. Criscuolo et al. (2005)
report higher innovation activity at multinational ﬁrms in the United Kingdom.
10A search on Econlit using the keywords “transfer pricing” and “multinational” yields 66 peer-reviewed journal
articles and 10 books.
11Eden (1998) also provides substantial coverage of non-academic evidence on the extent of transfer pricing and
tax minimization by multinationals.
12Halperin and Srinidhi (1991) and Narayanan and Smith (2000) also allow for decentralized decision-making
in models with a single transfer price.
13See, for example, Jenkins and Wright (1975), Bernard and Weiner (1990), Harris et al. (1993), Klassen et al.
(1993) and Collins et al. (1996).
14See, for example, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), who look at income shifting among OECD countries.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 5
2.1. Price-based studies
Very few studies of transfer pricing use actual price data. Lall (1973) investigates over-
invoicing by a small sample of Colombian pharmaceutical ﬁrms with foreign aﬃliates in response
to governmental restrictions on proﬁt repatriation. Foreign exchange and capital controls in
Colombia during the 1960s gave multinational ﬁrms an incentive to raise their intraﬁrm prices
above the arm’s-length level as a means of transferring proﬁts out of the country. Comparing
intraﬁrm import prices to arm’s-length prices for similar goods in local, regional and world
markets during 1968 to 1970, Lall ﬁnds that related-party prices ranged 33 to 300 percent
higher than arm’s-length prices.15
Two other studies, by Swenson (2001) and Clausing (2003), are more recent and cover a
wider range of industries. Both have as their focus the relationship between country corporate
t a x( a n dt a r i ﬀ) rates and transfer prices. Swenson (2001), using annual U.S. import data for ﬁve
countries during the 1980s, analyzes the response of average unit values across all (unobserved)
transactions within country-product pairs to variations in U.S. import tariﬀsa n df o r e i g nt a x
rates. She ﬁnds evidence that changes in prices are consistent with incentives based on taxes
and tariﬀs but that the economic magnitudes are small.16
Clausing (2003) uses data on import and export product prices collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) from 1997 to 1999 to investigate the eﬀect of country corporate tax rates
on related-party prices. The BLS data separately identify intraﬁrm and arm’s-length transac-
tions. Clausing ﬁnds price responses in the expected directions, i.e., higher taxes abroad are
associated with higher export prices and lower import prices for related-party transactions. Her
point estimates suggest that a 1 percent drop in taxes abroad reduces U.S. export prices between
related parties by 0.9 to 1.8 percent.17
2.2. Taxes
Before introducing our theoretical framework and empirical analysis we provide a brief dis-
cussion of the international tax environment facing U.S. ﬁrms. In the United States, ﬁrms are
taxed according to their worldwide income.18 As a result, U.S. ﬁrms must pay U.S. income tax
on both their domestic proﬁts as well as any foreign proﬁts that are repatriated to the United
States.19 The tax liability associated with foreign earnings, however, can be oﬀset by income
taxes the ﬁrm pays to other countries. If foreign proﬁts are taxed more lightly (heavily) than
domestic proﬁts, the ﬁrm is said to have ‘deﬁcit’ (‘excess’) foreign tax credits. If a ﬁrm has
deﬁcit foreign tax credits, its U.S. tax liability on foreign proﬁts is the diﬀerence between what
would be owed under the U.S. tax rate and what the ﬁrm actually paid to foreign government.
Excess foreign tax credits cannot be used to oﬀset ﬁrm’s tax liabilities on domestic income in
15A more extensive study by the Colombian government found prices to be an average of 155 percent higher.
Lall (1973) notes that similar studies subsequently undertaken by neighboring Latin American countries reached
similar conclusions.
16These results may be inﬂuenced by the fact that Swenson’s (2001) data do not separately identify arm’s-length
and related-party import transactions, nor do they allow one to control for ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in prices.
17Prices are imputed for 42 percent of Clausing’s (2003) transactions, and ﬁrm and product identiﬁers are
unavailable. As a result, ﬁrm- or product-speciﬁc variation in prices cannot be examined.
18This section draws on the discussion in Hines (1997).
19According to Subpart F rules of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, foreign proﬁts of certain majority-owned
foreign aﬃlitates are considered repatriated (i.e., “deemed distributed”) whether or not they are actually trans-
ferred back to the parent. The aﬀected aﬃliates are generally characterized as “passive” operations in tax haven
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the year they are incurred, but they can be used to some extent to oﬀset tax liabilities on foreign
income in prior or subsequent years, subject to U.S. Internal Revenue Service guidelines.
During our sample period, U.S. ﬁrms had at least two alternatives for booking export proﬁts.
First, they could be attributed to a Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) and U.S. tax liability would
be imposed at a reduced rate and could be oﬀset by foreign tax credits generated by other foreign
income. Second, U.S. exporters could classify up to 50 percent of their export proﬁts as foreign
source income and U.S. tax liability could be wholly or partly oﬀset by excess foreign tax credits
from other activities. Both of these policies create a motive for ﬁrms to over- or under-invoice
exports depending upon the tax rates of the destination countries. Firms booking proﬁts to a
FSC, for example, may have expected tax laws to change in their favor in the future. Indeed,
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, a corporate tax bill enacted in 2004 largely in response
to a World Trade Organization ruling against FSCs, allowed ﬁrms to repatriate their foreign
proﬁts at a highly advantageous tax rate.20 Allowing ﬁrms to book export proﬁts as foreign
income, on the other hand, essentially allowed ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits to escape
U.S. tax liability on those export proﬁts.21
As a consequence of these components of the tax law, even though the United States relies
upon a system of worldwide taxation, U.S. ﬁr m sc o n t i n u et of a c ei n c e n t i v e st om i n i m i z et h e i r
tax burden through transfer pricing. These incentives will exist whenever U.S. marginal tax
rates diﬀer from the combined burden of foreign marginal tax and tariﬀ rates. In the next
section we develop a framework that explicitly links foreign corporate taxes and transfer prices.
3. Theoretical Framework
The goal of our analysis is to understand the forces that shape multinationals’ arm’s-length
versus related-party prices. It is likely that the same forces that play a role in pricing also
inﬂuence multinationals more generally in terms of what they produce and where they locate.22
Here, however, we develop an explicitly partial equilibrium approach to the problem of transfer
pricing in that we take the location of ﬁrm activity as given and examine the variation in the
resulting prices.
In this section we consider the particular case of a ﬁrm exporting the same good both to a
related party and to an arm’s-length customer in the same destination country. Examination
of this case is useful for several reasons. First, it closely corresponds to the concept of arm’s-
length pricing used by U.S. and OECD tax authorities when evaluating transfer pricing for tax
purposes. Second, limiting our analysis to the same good sent to the same country enables us
to implicitly control for variation in both the nature of the product and in the cost structure of
the exporting ﬁrm. Finally, this framework corresponds closely to the main strands of research
in the existing theoretical literature.
While limited in scope, our focus is broader than most of the existing empirical literature on
transfer pricing in that we consider the role of product attributes, ﬁrm characteristics, exchange
rates and market structure in addition to that of taxes and tariﬀs in shaping related-party prices.
Given the high degree of concentration in U.S. exports, even this special case encompasses a
large fraction of related-party trade.
20Estimates of proﬁts to be repatriated at these favorable corporate tax rates (5.25% instead of 35%) range
from $320 billion (Wall Street Journal 2005) to as high as $520 billion (Business Week 2005).
21Kemsley (1995) shows that ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits arem o r el i k e l yt oe x p o r tf r o mt h eU n i t e d
States than to produce in an establishment located abroad.
22See Hines (1997) for a survey of the literature on the location of multinational activity.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 7
3.1. A model of transfer pricing
Our basic setup is straightforward and extends the framework developed in Hyde and Choe
(2005). The extensions include the introduction of downstream ﬁrms, tariﬀs, and exchange rates,
as well as a penalty function for tax minimization that depends upon the diﬀerence between
ﬁrms’ arm’s-length and related-party prices.23
We consider a multinational with two divisions: a home (h)o ﬃc ea n daf o r e i g n( f)a ﬃliate.
The home division produces an intermediate good which is sold at arm’s-length (quantity Qal)
to an unrelated foreign ﬁrm and to the foreign aﬃliate (quantity Qf). The good sold to both
customers is identical, and we assume that both customers reside in the same destination coun-
try.24 For simplicity we also assume that there are no costs of transforming the intermediate
good in the foreign country. Both the foreign arm’s-length ﬁrm and the foreign aﬃliate costlessly
transform the product and sell it to consumers in the foreign country.
The purchase of quantity Qal for price Pal by the arm’s-length foreign ﬁrm is payable in
domestic currency units subject to an ad valorem tariﬀ, τ, and an exchange rate, e,m e a s u r e di n
units of foreign currency per unit of home currency. The arm’s-length foreign ﬁrm in turn sells
the goods for price Sal in the foreign market in foreign currency. After-tax proﬁto ft h ef o r e i g n
arm’s-length ﬁrm is given by
πal =( 1 − tf)(SalQal − (1 + τ)ePalQal) (1)
where Sal =( 1 + τ)ePal. (2)
The multinational ﬁrm (legally) keeps two sets of books, one used to set incentives within
the ﬁrm, i.e., used by foreign managers to make quantity and price decisions and also to reward
those same foreign managers, and the other reported to tax authorities in both countries and to
customs authorities as the goods cross the border.
Pre-tax proﬁts for the two divisions of the multinational are given by
˜ πh = PalQal + PinQf − c(Qf + Qal) (3)
˜ πf = SfQf − ePinQf − τePtxQf (4)
where Pin is the internal incentive transfer price for the intermediate good paid by the foreign
division, Ptx is the transfer price of the intermediate good reported to the tax and customs
authorities, and Sf is the price faced by the ﬁnal customer of the foreign aﬃliate. The constant
marginal cost of production is given by c.25
Taxable income for each division of the multinational is given by
Ih = PalQal + PtxQf − c(Qf + Qal) (5)
If = SfQf − (1 + τ)ePtxQf. (6)
23In Hyde and Choe (2005), the government compares ﬁrm’s arm’s-length prices to an exogenous benchmark.
24By intermediate good we merely mean that the good is not directly consumed by the foreign importing ﬁrm,
i.e. it is subject to further processing or handling by wholesale and/or retail establishments. We assume that
there are no sales to the domestic market and we do not model any potential competition in the downstream
market.
25The appropriate marginal cost for tax purposes would include non-production components such as interest
and depreciation changes. For sales to the arm’s-length customer we assume that the importing ﬁrm pays the
tariﬀ. Ernst and Young (2003) report that 75 percent of U.S. multinationals consider the customs and VAT
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We assume the transfer price is bounded from below by the ﬁrm’s marginal cost and from
a b o v eb ya na m o u n t ,B , that prevents the taxable income of the foreign aﬃliate from becoming
negative, i.e., c ≤ Ptx ≤ B where If (B)=0 ,r e ﬂecting the likely objections of the tax
authorities.
After-tax proﬁt of the two divisions is given by
πh =˜ πh − thIh =( 1− th)[PalQal − c(Qf + Qal)] + (Pin − thPtx)Qf (7)
πf =˜ πf − tfIf =( 1− tf)[SfQf] − (ePin +( τ − tf (1 + τ))ePtx)Qf (8)
where th and tf are home and foreign tax rates respectively.
The arm’s-length foreign ﬁrm chooses the quantity to sell, Qal, given the price it faces from
t h eh o m ea ﬃliate of the multinational, the foreign tax rate, tariﬀ, and exchange rate as as well as





e(1 + τ)Pal. (9)
The foreign aﬃliate of the multinational solves a similar problem. The price, Sf, and thus the
quantity of intraﬁrm sales, depends on both transfer prices, Pin and Ptx, foreign taxes, tariﬀs,
and the exchange rate. The foreign aﬃliate chooses the quantity to sell given the foreign tax,









(Pin +( τ − tf − τtf)Ptx).( 1 0 )
After-tax proﬁts for the parent ﬁrm are given by




+(tf (1 + τ) − (τ + th))PtxQf.
The last term in equation 11 shows clearly that the proﬁts of the parent are decreasing in
the reported transfer price when the home tax rate is above the foreign tax rate. Without
some restriction on behavior, the ﬁrm will choose the lowest possible transfer price. Similarly, a
positive tariﬀ rate will also induce the ﬁrm to minimize the reported transfer price.26
If the transfer price reported by the ﬁrm deviates too far from the tax authority’s expectation
the ﬁrm may face a penalty, or at a minimum, an expensive audit. We consider the case where





that is increasing in the price diﬀerence between arm’s-length and tax-transfer prices and the
quantity shipped intraﬁrm. The exogenous parameter, θ ∈ (0,1), indicates that the ﬁrm does
26If the foreign income tax rate is higher than domestic income tax rate, then the response of the after-tax
proﬁts of the parent to a higher tax/border transfer price depends on the level of the tariﬀ,a n dt h et w oi n c o m e
tax rates. If tf >t h and tf − th < (1 − tf)τ then
∂πp
∂Ptx < 0. Normally high (relative) foreign income tax
rates would induce the ﬁrm to raise the reported transfer price to shift proﬁts into the low-tax home country.
However, with small diﬀerences in income tax rates, high tariﬀs can induce the ﬁrm to once again reduce the
reported transfer price to reduce tariﬀ payments. See Swenson (2001) for a discussion.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 9
not expect to repay the entire diﬀerence in the revenue streams. This penalty function captures
the idea that the domestic tax authority focuses on the foregone tax revenue from intraﬁrm
sales.27
After-tax proﬁts for the parent ﬁrm are now given by









The ﬁrm chooses (Pal,P in,P tx) yielding ﬁrst-order conditions:






(1 − th)(μal +1 ) Qal
=0 (13)





[Pin − (1 − th)c − thPtx − θQf (Pal − Ptx)
2] (15)
+[tf (1 + τ) − τ − th]Qf + θ(Pal − Ptx)Q =0
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain three equilibrium relationships. First, from equation








(1 − th)(μal +1 ) Qal
. (16)
The simple set-up for the arm’s-length price is an important component of the framework as it
explicitly introduces the market power of the ﬁrm in the pricing decision. Greater market power
increases the price to the arm’s-length customer.
Second, from equation 14, we see that the incentive transfer price consists of a weighted
average of the marginal cost of production and the tax transfer price as well as a term from the
penalty function,
Pin =( 1− th)c + thPtx − θQf (Pal − Ptx)
2 . (17)
Finally, from equations 15 and 14, we obtain the following relationship between taxes, tariﬀs,
and the transfer price reported to the tax authorities:
(Pal − Ptx)θQf = th − tf + τ (1 − tf). (18)
The left hand side of equation 18 gives the marginal cost to the ﬁrm of deviating from the
arm’s-length price while the right hand side represents the marginal beneﬁto fd e v i a t i n g . I n
equilibrium, the ﬁrm sets the transfer price reported to the tax and customs authorities to
equalize the costs and beneﬁts. The tax transfer price, Ptx, equals the arm’s-length price, Pal,
only when the tariﬀ-adjusted diﬀerence in tax rates is zero. When th >t f + τ (1 − tf),e . g .
whenever the home tax rate is above the foreign rate or whenever tariﬀsa r es u ﬃciently large,
the ﬁrm will choose to report a transfer price below the arm’s-length price. Decreases in the
foreign tax rate increase the price diﬀerence as do increases in the tariﬀ. The larger the quantity
27Alternatively, the penalty function could be modeled as the outcome of strategic choices by both the ﬁrm and
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shipped to the foreign aﬃliate the greater the cost to the ﬁrm resulting in a smaller equilibrium
price diﬀerence.
In spite of the relative simplicity of the framework it does not yield closed-form solutions
for either linear or constant-elasticity of substitution demand. As a result, we solve the model
numerically.28 Figure 3 displays the relationship between the price wedge and underlying para-
meters assuming linear demand. In the Figure, the price wedge is deﬁned as the log diﬀerence
between the arm’s-length and related-party prices, e.g., ln(Pal)−ln(Ptx). Appendix A describes
the parameterization of the model.
As indicated in the ﬁrst two panels, the price wedge is decreasing in the foreign tax rate
and increasing in the foreign tariﬀ.T h eﬁnal panel reveals a positive relationship between the
price wedge and movements in the foreign exchange rate. While the multinational reduces all
three of its prices as the exchange rate increases, the transfer price falls faster than the arm’s-
length price. The diﬀerence between the arm’s-length price and the incentive price narrows
dramatically as the exchange rate rises.
We use the framework developed in this section as a guide for empirical analysis. As in the
existing theoretical and empirical literature, tax and tariﬀ diﬀerences across countries provide
an incentive for ﬁrms to vary their transfer prices as well as their arm’s-length prices and induce
a wedge between arm’s-length and intraﬁrm prices even for the same product destined for the
same country.
We note that this model does not include other relevant aspects of the pricing decision.
For example any relationship-speciﬁc components of the arm’s-length transaction have been
assumed away. Firms that repeatedly deal with the same customers, for example, may oﬀer
price discounts. Also, ﬁrms may have to oﬀer explicit or implicit guarantees for products sold at
arm’s length which would tend raise the arm’s-length price above the intraﬁrm price. Similarly,
intraﬁrm sales may act like implicit long-term contracts and thus lower the price relative to
arm’s-length sales. More generally, unmeasured aspects of the transaction will tend to push the
arm’s-length price away from the related-party price.
4. Data Description
At the heart of our empirical analysis is the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction
Database (LFTTD) which links individual trade transactions to ﬁrms in the United States.29
This dataset has two components. The ﬁrst, foreign trade data assembled by the U.S. Census
Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau, captures all U.S. international trade transactions between
1993 and 2000 inclusive. For each ﬂo wo fg o o d sa c r o s saU . S .b o r d e r ,t h i sd a t a s e tr e c o r d st h e
product classiﬁcation, the value and quantity shipped, the date of the shipment, the destination
(or source) country, the transport mode, and whether the transaction takes place at “arm’s
length” or between “related parties”.30 “Related-party”, or intraﬁrm, trade refers to shipments
between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries as well as trade between U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign companies and their aﬃliates abroad. For export transactions, ﬁrms are “related”
if either party owns, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the other party (see Section
30.7(v) of the Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations). This deﬁnition of related party corresponds
28Numerical solutions are obtained via Mathematica. The code for obtaining solutions is available from the
authors upon request.
29See Bernard et al. (2005) for a description of the LFTTD and its construction.
30See Appendix A for a discussion and an example of the Shipper’s Export Declaration which form the basis
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exactly to that used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in their annual surveys of multinational
activity.
The second component of the LFTTD is the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of
the U.S. Census Bureau, which records annual employment and survival information for most
U.S. establishments.31 Employment information for each establishment is collected in March of
every year and we aggregate the establishment data up to the level of the ﬁrm. Matching the
annual information in the LBD to the transaction-level trade data yields the LFTTD. Products
in the LFTTD are tracked according to ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) categories, which
break exported goods into 8572 products. These products are distributed across two-digit HS
“industries” as noted in Table 1. Table 1 also records the share of exports in the industry that
are intraﬁrm and the share of total U.S. exports accounted by the sector.
4.1. Exports Across Firms
The comprehensive nature of the trade transaction data allows us to develop an intimate
picture of the ﬁrms that export from the United States. Figure 1 shows the distribution of
total U.S. exports across exporting ﬁrms where the ﬁrms have been sorted by the value of their
exports. Exports come from a remarkably small number of ﬁrms. Fewer than 4 percent of all
U.S. ﬁrms export any amount at all. Among this select group of ﬁrms, the top one percent of
U.S. exporters (1673 ﬁrms in 2000) control over 80 percent of total exports. The top ten percent
of exporters are responsible for more than 95 percent of exports.
Our focus is on the behavior of multinational ﬁrms. Figure 2 shows that the concentration of
U . S .e x p o r t si sh e a v i l yi n ﬂuenced by the presence of multinational ﬁrms. In 2000, multinational
ﬁrms account for more than 93 percent of all U.S. exports. The ﬁgure also allows us to see the
relative importance of intraﬁrm versus arm’s-length activity in multinational ﬁrms. Related-
party exports make up slightly more than one third of all multinational export shipments.
These three facts, the concentration of U.S. exports among a small number of ﬁrms, the
dominant role of multinationals in that select group, and the large role of intraﬁrm trade in
multinational shipments, combine to emphasize the importance of understanding the cross-
border pricing behavior of multinational ﬁrms.
4.2. The Transfer Pricing Dataset
In this paper we use the LFTTD to focus on the export transactions of U.S.-based ﬁrms (as
distinct from ﬁrms with U.S. nationality).32 From the raw LFTTD we make two adjustments
to create our estimation sample. First we eliminate ﬁrms with fewer than 10 transactions
during 1993 to 2000 inclusive. Second we eliminate all transactions with missing, imputed or
“converted” quantities to ensure that all the observations for a particular product are measured
in comparable units and are actually recorded by the transacting ﬁrm. Depending on the year,
these screens reduce the number of transactions in our sample by 12 to 20 percent relative to
the raw data. For the remaining observations, we compute the export price as the unit value
of the transaction, i.e., total value per unit quantity.33
31This dataset excludes the U.S. Postal Service and ﬁrms in agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing, railroads, ed-
ucation, public administration and several smaller sectors. See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for an extensive
discussion of the LBD and its construction.
32As discussed further below, the export data allow us to control for the identity of the exporting ﬁrm.
33Units vary by HS product, e.g. dozens of shirts or pairs of shoes.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 12
In order to understand the role of product and country characteristics in shaping related-
party prices we link several additional datasets to the LFTTD. Two datasets record time-series
variation in international corporate tax rates. The ﬁrst is the World Tax Database (WTD)
compiled by the Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan.34 From the
WTD, we use the maximum statutory corporate tax rate. Table 2 reports the maximum
corporate tax rate for countries in the database for 2000. Across the 140 countries, the mean
(median) tax rate is 30.8 (32) and the rates range from zero in the tax havens of Bermuda and
the Bahamas to 54 percent in Iran. One-hundred-twelve countries (80 percent) have tax rates
at or below that of the United States. Table 2 also reports estimates of countries eﬀective tax
rates estimated from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data, which record foreign revenues
as well as the foreign taxes paid by foreign aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms.35 Following the literature,
we estimate an eﬀective corporate tax rate for country c in year t by dividing the foreign income
taxes paid by total foreign revenue less cost of goods sold and selling and administrative costs.
The ideal rate as suggested by the model is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal tax rate and, as such,
neither measure of country tax rates is entirely satisfactory. Firms, especially multinationals,
may receive a variety of tax holidays or exemptions that reduce their own marginal tax rate rel-
ative to the published statutory maximum. The calculated eﬀective rate represents an average,
rather than a marginal, rate across ﬁrms in a destination country.
Two datasets provide product information: the ﬁrst is from Rauch (1999) and is used to group
products into diﬀerentiated and non-diﬀerentiated categories. The second is from the UNCTAD
TRAINS database and provides tariﬀ rates for six-digit HS (HS6) categories by country for 1993
to 1998.36 Table 1 reports the average diﬀerences in maximum and minimum tariﬀ rates across
products within two digit industries. The range of tariﬀs (highest minus lowest) across countries
for the typical product is 64 percent. For example, the tariﬀ rate on handheld computers (HS
847130) ranges from 0 (Canada and others) to 22 percent (Brazil), with a mean and median of
4 percent while the tariﬀ rate on men’s dress shirts (HS 480990) ranges from 0 (Norway) to 80
percent (Mauritius).
Real exchange rates are constructed using monthly data on the end of period (line ae) nominal
exchange rate and CPI (line 64) from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Exchange
rates are given in log units of foreign currency per U.S. dollar.
5. The “Arm’s Length Standard” and “Comparable Uncontrolled Prices”
In order to examine the transfer pricing behavior of multinational ﬁrms, we want to compare
the price associated with each of a ﬁrm’s related-party (i.e., “controlled”) transactions to some
reference, or benchmark, price. As indicated in both the U.S. Treasury regulations and OECD
tax guidelines, the preferred benchmark for determining the appropriate transfer price is the
“arm’s-length standard”.37 The reported transfer price must be “consistent with the results
34See http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm to view the dataset or a more detailed descrip-
tion of it.
35See http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm#_1_24 to view the dataset or a more detailed description of
it.
36These data are available and described in greater detail on the web at http://r0.unctad.org/trains/
37As stated in OECD (1995), “[When] conditions are made or imposed between ... two [associated] enterprises
in their commercial or ﬁnancial relations which diﬀer from those which would be made between independent
enterprises, then any proﬁts which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but,
by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the proﬁts of that enterprise and taxed
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that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction
under the same circumstances” (Treasury Regulations §1.482-1(b)(1)).
While there are several approved methods for satisfying the arm’s-length standard, the most
commonly used is the price associated with corresponding arm’s-length (i.e., “uncontrolled”)
transactions, the so-called “comparable uncontrolled price” (CUP).38 The U.S. tax code and
OECD tax guidelines indicate the desirability of a tight match between the characteristics of
the related-party and CUP transactions. Here, we make full use of the unique level of detail
available in the LFTTD dataset to deﬁne the CUPs used in our analysis very narrowly, i.e., to
match the characteristics of the transactions as closely as possible.
Denote the related-party price of product i from ﬁrm f to country c in month t by transport
mode m as rpficmt.39 We deﬁne the comparable uncontrolled price associated with this related-










ficmt is one of the ﬁrm’s N arm’s-length export prices of product i to country c in
month t by transport mode m.N o t e t h a t i f N =0 , i.e., if the ﬁrm does not export to an
arm’s-length party within the product-country-mode-month bin, the CUP for a related-party
transaction does not exist. Of the more than 15 million related-party export transactions in
the LFTTD, roughly 4 million can be associated with our deﬁnition of a CUP. These matched
transactions account for roughly one third of the total value of related-party exports in 2000.
For each related-party export transaction that can be matched to a comparable uncontrolled
price, we deﬁne the arm’s-length-related-party (ALRP) price wedge to be the diﬀerence between
the log CUP and the log related-party price,
wedgeficmt =l ncupficmt− lnrpficmt. (20)
As noted in the theoretical discussion in Section 3, wedgeficmt is expected to be greater than
zero. The wedge will be positive when the arm’s-length price is marked up over marginal cost
and when the U.S. tax rate is greater than the tariﬀ-adjusted foreign tax rate.
In addition to adhering to U.S. and OECD guidelines, the narrowness of the CUPs we
deﬁne aﬀord several advantages vis-a-vis the data used in previous examinations of multinational
transfer pricing behavior. In particular, within-ﬁrm comparisons of export prices to both
arm’s-length and related parties allo w su st oc o n t r o lf o rt i m e - v a r y i n gﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal
costs. Unlike previous empirical studies, we are able to both more closely match the theory and
the deﬁnitions of arm’s-length prices preferred by most national tax authorities. In addition,
our comparison of prices within ﬁrms, months, products, destination countries and modes of
transport minimizes the likelihood that the ALRP price wedge captures price variation due
to product heterogeneity or varying market conditions. Firms’ chosen mode of transport, for
example, has been associated with variation in product quality, time sensitivity and other factors
that might aﬀect price (Harrigan 2005; Hummels and Skiba 2004).40
38Ernst and Young (2003) report that CUP was the most common method used to create transfer prices for
their tangible goods, used by 35 percent of surveyed multinationals.
39Transport mode refers to whether the product is sent by air, ship or some other method.
40We caution that even within a relatively narrow product category, it is possible that a ﬁrm may be shipping
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Even though we are able to diﬀerence out product, time, country, mode-of-transport and
ﬁrm eﬀects, there remain unobservable attributes of the transactions that may vary across arm’s-
length and related-party customers. While the HS classiﬁcation is highly disaggregate, we do
not have information on very detailed product characteristics or ancillary services (packaging,
marketing, etc.) embedded in products or provided by exporters that might explain the price
diﬀerential between related-party and arm’s-length prices. In addition, transactions inside the
ﬁrm may act like implicit long-term contracts and as a result be priced below similar arm’s-
length trades. We caution that the levels of the price wedge must be interpreted in light of these
unobservables, i.e., the mere existence of a positive price wedge does not imply inappropriate
behavior by the ﬁrm.
5.1. The ALRP Wedge
We report the price wedge for successively stringent dimensions of the data in Table 3. In
each case, we ﬁnd that U.S.-based exporters charge arm’s-length customers higher prices for
their products than related-party customers.
As indicated in the ﬁnal row of the table, the mean ALRP wedge for CUPs within products,
months, countries, modes of transport and ﬁrm as deﬁned in equation 20, is 0.43 log points.
The mean wedge in the penultimate row of the table, which pools across ﬁrms within products,
months, countries and modes of transport to deﬁne the CUP, is nearly three times larger, at 1.13
log points. For CUPs deﬁned “just” within products, months and countries, the mean wedge is
1.92 log points, or almost ﬁve times larger.
Our theoretical framework includes an important role for product characteristics in deter-
mining the wedge between arm’s-length and related-party prices. If the exporting ﬁrm has no
market power in the product then in the absence of tax or tariﬀ incentives the arm’s-length and
related-party prices should coincide. Even with diﬀerences in taxes and tariﬀsa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s ,
if the product in question is an undiﬀerentiated commodity the exporting ﬁrm may have little
opportunity to shift proﬁts between aﬃliates without risking oﬀending one of the relevant tax
authorities.41 As a result we expect that there will be substantial diﬀerences in the price wedge
for diﬀerentiated and commodity products.
Table 4 documents that the price wedge is substantially larger for diﬀerentiated products
than for commodities. We make this comparison using three diﬀerent classiﬁcations of product
diﬀerentiation. The ﬁrst classiﬁcation is based upon a “naive” inspection of the HS industry
identiﬁers reported in Table 4: products in two-digit HS industries 01 to 21 and 25 to 29 are
designated “commodities”, products in industries 84 to 97 are denominated “diﬀerentiated”.
The second and third classiﬁcations are due to Rauch (1999), who provides conservative and
liberal identiﬁcations of commodities according to whether goods are quoted on an organized
exchange.42 The Rauch classiﬁcation separates products into three categories: “commodities”,
which are traded on an exchange, “reference-priced”, which are not traded on an exchange but
whose prices can be found in catalogs, and “diﬀerentiated”, whose prices cannot be looked up.
We combine the commodity and reference-priced categories into a single group.
All three classiﬁcation schemes oﬀer similar results. Wedges are positive for both commodities
and diﬀerentiated goods, but they are substantially larger for diﬀerentiated goods. The average
41Similarly, it is plausible that ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to justify diﬀerences between arm’s-length and related-party
prices for custom-tailored, i.e., diﬀerentiated, goods than commodities.
42The Rauch (1999) classiﬁcations are for four-digit SITC industries. To make use of it here, we concord
ten-digit HS products to these industries using the concordances available in Feenstra et al. (2002).Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 15
price wedge for commodity products ranges from 8.8 log points using the HS-based classiﬁcation
to 17.6 log points using the conservative Rauch system. The price wedge for diﬀerentiated
goods, by contrast, is 66.7 log points according to the HS-based system and 52.8 log points
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eR a u c hd e ﬁnition. In line with the model introduced above, the gap between
commodity and diﬀerentiated-good wedges indicates that commodity product markets are less
likely to show evidence of diﬀerential pricing behavior. For the remainder of the paper, we focus
on diﬀerentiated goods by dropping all transactions designated as ‘commodity’ in the HS-based
classiﬁcation system.
Though the evidence presented in this section demonstrates that ALRP wedges are sizeable,
it does not pin down the source of the price diﬀerences. If we make the strong assumption
that ﬁrms’ related-party prices are an accurate estimate of their marginal costs, and ignore all
other potential sources of price variation, it implies an average markup in the sample of 43
percent. However, we suspect that omitted characteristics of the transaction are responsible for
a substantial amount of the ALRP price wedge. In the next section we examine the relationship
between the price wedge and product, ﬁrm and country attributes.
6. Main Results
The theoretical model in the Section 3 shows that the diﬀerence between arm’s-length and
related-party prices depends on ﬁrm, product and country characteristics. In this section we
examine the variation in arm’s-length and related-party prices by U.S. exporters from 1993 to
2000. The basic empirical speciﬁcation regresses ﬁrms’ ALRP price wedges on destination-
country tax rates and destination-country product-level import tariﬀ r a t e sa sw e l la sp r o x i e so f
product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrm market power.
6.1. Taxes, Tariﬀsa n dt h eP r i c eW e d g e
The role of taxes on transfer pricing has dominated the existing theoretical and empirical
literature. In this section we investigate the relationship between countries’ corporate tax rates
and their product-level import tariﬀs on transfer pricing. As discussed in Sections 2 and 3,
the expected relationship between the foreign tax rate and the ALRP price wedge is negative.
Low (high) destination-country tax rates provide ﬁrms with an incentive to report relatively
low (high) related-party prices. Firms are also expected to change their related-party prices
in response to tariﬀs. As noted in the theoretical framework, ﬁrms have an incentive to lower
their related-party prices when exporting to countries with high import tariﬀs.
The ideal dataset for examining the inﬂuence of tax rates on multinational ﬁrms’ pricing
behavior would track the nationality of ownership of each ﬁrm, the relevant (preferably ﬁrm-
speciﬁc) corporate tax rates in the countries to which they export, and, for U.S. ﬁrms, their
worldwide tax exposure. While we have substantial detail on individual transactions, we do
n o th a v ea n yd e t a i lo ne i t h e rﬁrms’ corporate structure or their foreign earnings. As a result
we estimate a simple regression of the ALRP price wedge on the destination country tax rate.
The ﬁrst and second columns of Table 5 report the results using statutory maximum tax
rates from the Michigan World Tax Database. Column one reports results with no ﬁxed eﬀects
while column two includes products ﬁxed eﬀects. In both cases, as predicted by the model,
we ﬁnd large, statistically signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcients for both speciﬁcations. Across
the two speciﬁcations, a decrease of one percentage point in the tax rate is associated with an
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Using eﬀective tax rates calculated from BEA data in columns three and four, we again
ﬁnd the expected negative relationship. The point estimates are smaller, 0.5 to 1.7, and are
signiﬁcant at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 examine the role of tariﬀso np r i c ed i ﬀerentials. In the
model, high tariﬀs work like low corporate income taxes as they give ﬁrms the incentive to
lower related-party prices. The availability of the tariﬀ data is more limited, cutting the sample
size substantially. Pooling all products and countries in an OLS speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a negative
relationship between tariﬀs and the ALRP price wedge. However, once we look within a product,
or within a ﬁrm-product pair, we ﬁnd the expected positive relationship.43 A one percentage
point increase in the tariﬀ increases the price wedge by 0.60 to 0.63 percentage points.
The results presented in this section provide evidence that taxes and tariﬀs matter for transfer
pricing by multinationals. Even for products with transactions matched very narrowly to a
CUP, we ﬁnd that lower taxes and higher tariﬀs increase the gap between arm’s-length and
related-party prices.
6.2. Market Structure, Taxes and Tariﬀs
In this section we examine the association between the ALRP wedge and market structure
controlling for cross-country diﬀerences in corporate tax and tariﬀ rates.
Firms with greater market power and those selling to less competitive product markets are
expected to have larger price wedges. Lacking direct measures of market power or product-
market competitiveness, we use three proxies: ﬁrm size as measured by log total employment;
ﬁrm’s share of U.S. exports in the product across all countries; and the number of U.S.-based
ﬁrms exporting the product to a particular destination country during each calendar year. If the
price wedge is increasing in the market power of the ﬁrm, and if our measures capture aspects
of ﬁrm pricing power and market structure, then we would expect to see a positive correlation
between ﬁrm size and the wedge. Similarly, the wedge would be increasing in the export share
of the ﬁrm and decreasing in the number of exporters in the product-destination country.
Results are reported in Table 6. Columns one to three present OLS regressions including
our proxies for market structure along with Michigan WTD tax rates and product ﬁxed ef-
fects.44 In each case the measure of market structure has the expected sign and is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Firm size and ﬁrm export share are positively correlated with
the price wedge while the count of ﬁrms per product-destination country is negative. In every
speciﬁcation, destination-country tax rates are negatively associated with the arms’ length price
wedge; coeﬃcients are large in magnitude and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Tariﬀs enter with the expected positive sign. The coeﬃcients on tax rates and tariﬀsa r eo f
a comparable order of magnitude as predicted by the theoretical framework; a decrease in the
corporate tax rate or an increase in the tariﬀ rate of one percentage point increases the gap
between arm’s-length and related-party prices by 0.56 to 0.66 percent.
The coeﬃcients reported here correspond to substantial price diﬀerences across ﬁrms and
countries. Using the estimated coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase
in log employment or ﬁrm export share corresponds to an increase of the price wedge by 2
percent, while increasing the number of ﬁrms exporting in a product to a country by a standard
deviation decreases the price wedge by 0.1 percent. The diﬀerence in maximum corporate
43These results suggest that, within a country, high-tariﬀ products are those with low wedges — possibly because
of low market power.
44Results using the BEA eﬀective tax rate are analogous and available from the authors upon request.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 17
tax rates between Mexico (35%) and Chile (15%) corresponds to a 11.2 percent increase in the
price wedge (column 1). For handheld computers (HS 847130), the diﬀerence in import tariﬀs
between Canada (no tariﬀ) and Brazil (22 percent) corresponds to a 12.2 percent increase in
the price wedge (column 1).
To our knowledge, the results in Table 6 provide the ﬁrst evidence that ﬁrm characteristics
and market structure inﬂuence transfer pricing by multinationals. Greater market power is
associated with larger wedges between arm’s-length and intraﬁrm prices.
6.3. Exchange Rates and the Price Wedge
This section examines how exchange rates aﬀect prices set by multinational ﬁrms to their
arm’s-length and related-party customers. There is a large body of research on pricing-to-
market by exporters, see Knetter (1989, 1993) and the survey in Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
This literature has focused on the interaction of ﬁrm pricing (market) power and changes in the
real exchange and generally concludes that ﬁrms “price-to-market”, i.e., their prices partially
oﬀs e te x c h a n g er a t em o v e m e n t s . 45 For the most part the pricing-to-market literature has been
silent on whether the international structure of the ﬁrm shapes price responses to exchange
rates. An exception is Rangan and Lawrence (1993) who argue that the presence of intraﬁrm
exports by U.S. multinationals and their low price responsiveness explains low U.S. aggregate
export price responsiveness during the dollar decline in the late 1980s.46 We use the matched
transactions and the ALRP price wedge to test whether U.S.-based multinationals change their
prices diﬀerently for arm’s-length and related-party customers.
The basic framework in the pricing-to-market literature can be directly applied to the eﬀect
of exchange rates on arm’s-length prices in our theoretical framework. In response to a dollar
(home currency) appreciation, the home aﬃliate lowers dollar-based prices to the arm’s-length
customer. The degree of the price reduction depends on the demand elasticity in the foreign
market. In contrast, the internal transfer price set by the ﬁrm is much less sensitive to the
appreciation, as is seen in Figure 3; the foreign aﬃliate sees an increase in its marginal cost (the
foreign currency price of the intermediate rises) and responds by raising its ﬁnal good price thus
lowering quantity demanded. In the absence of tax diﬀerences or tariﬀs, the ALRP wedge falls
by the amount of the change in the arm’s-length price. If there are tax diﬀerences between
the countries or in the presence of a tariﬀ,t h eﬁrm has an incentive to adjust its tax transfer
price. In the case of linear ﬁnal good demand, the adjustment of the tax transfer price is greater
than the arm’s-length price leading to a positive expected sign of the relationship between the
exchange rate and the price wedge.
Table 7 adds the log of real exchange rate to the speciﬁcation with tax, tariﬀ,a n dn u m b e r
of exporters in column four of Table 6. The real exchange rate is deﬁned in units of foreign
currency per US dollar and the value for month m, lnRERm, is the rate on the last day of
the month before the trade transaction. Column two uses the WTD marginal rate as the tax
variable while column three uses the BEA average tax rate.
45Goldberg and Knetter (1997) ﬁnd that the typical response is on the order of 50 percent, i.e. half of the
exchange rate change shows up in the destination market price.
46Clausing (2003) reports the opposite result, i.e., that prices for intraﬁrm exports respond much more strongly
to an exchange rate change (no pass-through of the exchange rate change to the price in the foreign currency)
than do prices of arm’s-length transactions (65 percent pass-through). Adding controls for GDP and GDP per
capita, Clausing (2003) ﬁnds an unexpected signiﬁcantly positive response of arm’s-length export prices to a dollar
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In both cases we see a signiﬁcant response of the price wedge to the real exchange rate. A
one percent appreciation of the dollar results in a 0.19 percent reduction in the price wedge, in
contrast to the theoretical prediction of the model. The narrowing of the price wedge in response
to a home currency appreciation suggests that incentive prices may be playing a stronger role
than suggested in the theoretical framework.
These results provide the ﬁrst evidence that multinationals diﬀerentially adjust their prices
inside and outside the ﬁrm in response to exchange rate movements. Changes in the exchange
rate result in relatively larger movements of arm’s-length prices than of intraﬁrm prices suggest-
ing that intraﬁrm trade may provide multinationals with a means to insulate themselves from
exchange rate shocks.
6.4. Robustness
In this section we analyze the robustness of our results by allowing for two alternative
formulations of the ALRP price wedge and including an additional country characteristic, per
capita GDP. Results are reported in Table 8.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 8 examine the robustness of our results to two alternate
deﬁnitions of comparable uncontrolled prices. As noted above, tax guidelines do not specify
exactly how an arm’s-length based CUP is to be computed. Here, we consider price wedges
relying upon a value weighted average of arm’s-length prices (columns one and two) and the
median arm’s-length price (columns three and four), in both cases computing these CUPs within
ﬁrms, products, countries, modes of transport and month. As noted in the table, the qualitative
implications of our baseline results are supported. Both the weighted average price wedge and
the median price wedge increase with our proxy for ﬁrms’ market power, and both are greater
for goods sent to countries with lower corporate tax rates and higher tariﬀs.
Both tax rates and tariﬀs may be correlated with other country characteristics, in particular
GDP per capita. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 8 reveal that using our preferred measure of
the ALRP price wedge, controlling for per capita GDP does not alter coeﬃcient estimates on our
variables of interest in any substantial way. The coeﬃcient on per capita GDP itself varies from
positive and statistically insigniﬁcant in the ﬁrst column to negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in the second column.
7. Implications
The previous section documents substantial pricing responses by U.S.-based multinationals
to both tax and tariﬀ diﬀerences across countries. Here we calculate “back-of-the-envelope”
estimates of the lost tax revenue for the U.S. Treasury and compute “transfer-price” adjustments
to the reported value of U.S. merchandise exports and imports.
To estimate the magnitudes of these aggregate eﬀects we ask how much larger U.S. exports
would be and how much smaller U.S. imports would be if every trading partner had the same
top marginal tax rate as the United States. We note that analysis requires a number of strong
assumptions, in particular that ﬁrms would not adjust either destinations or quantities if coun-
tries altered their tax rates, and that import and export prices would respond symmetrically
to these changes. We caution that our estimates are crude and should be taken as suggestive
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We estimate the magnitude of trade-ﬂow adjustments to be
Underreported export valuec = RPEXc · ˆ β (UStax− taxc)
Overreported import valuec = RPIMc · ˆ β (UStax− taxc)
where RPEXc and RPIMc are total reported values of related-party exports to and imports
from country c, respectively, UStaxc and taxc are the top marginal tax rates for the United States
and country c, respectively, and ˆ β is an estimated tax elasticity from the previous section. Our
preferred estimate comes from Table 7, column 1. We compute the foregone tax revenue to the
U.S. Treasury by assuming that all under- or over-reported trade would be subject to the top
marginal U.S. corporate tax rate.
Our 2004 estimates of under-reported exports and over-reported imports for sixteen trading
partners, accounting for three quarters of U.S. trade, are reported in the top and bottom panels
of Table 9, respectively. Somewhat surprisingly, the magnitude of adjustment to exports, and
the resulting tax loss, are relatively modest. Exports are estimated to be underreported by $1.9
billion in 2004 with a corresponding tax loss of $666 million. This small size of the tax loss is
driven by the fact that the U.S. exports primarily to developed economies that have similar, or
even higher corporate tax rates. Without the large value of related-party exports to Canada,
the lost tax revenue rises to $1.2 billion.47
The import numbers, shown in the bottom panel, are substantially larger. Related party
imports are estimated to be inﬂated by over $13 billion with a corresponding loss to the U.S.
Treasury of $4.8 billion. The disparity between the export numbers and the import numbers
is driven by the diﬀerences in sources and destinations. Imports are more likely to come from
countries with relatively low corporate tax rates.
8. Conclusions
Multinational ﬁrms based in the U.S. report large diﬀerences in prices for arm’s-length and
related-party exports. These diﬀerences exist even for the same product produced by the same
ﬁrm shipped to the same country in the same month by the same mode of transport. Following
the development of a simple theoretical framework we ﬁnd that the price wedge between arm’s-
length and intraﬁrm prices responds to diﬀerences in market structure, taxes, and tariﬀs.
Commodity products show much smaller price wedges while those for diﬀerentiated products
are large, averaging over 67 percent. Similarly, ﬁrms with characteristics indicating greater
market power, i.e., larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with bigger export shares, have larger price diﬀerences.
Looking across countries, we ﬁnd the price wedge is larger when the number of exporting ﬁrms
is smaller.
Much of the interest in transfer pricing centers on the behavior of ﬁrms in response to taxes
and tariﬀs. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in price wedges for the same product in countries
with diﬀerent tax and tariﬀ rates. Lower corporate taxes and higher tariﬀs are associated with
larger gaps between the arm’s-length and related-party prices.
Our results suggest that transfer pricing may be playing an important role in aggregate na-
tional accounting, potentially reducing the reported value of exports and the current account
(and thus GDP). The response of the price wedge to tax rates indicates that tax minimiza-
47The estimated tax losses are substantially larger if we use the point estimates from the median wedge regression
in Table 8, column 5; $4 billion for exports and $29 billion for imports.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 20
tion may be an important part of transfer pricing decisions with consequences for the level of
corporate tax revenue and strategic responses to changes in the tax code.
This paper also provides some of the ﬁrst evidence on the eﬀect of exchange rates on pricing
decisions inside and outside the ﬁrm. The price wedge responds to movements in the real
exchange rate: an appreciation of the dollar is associated with a substantial narrowing of the
wedge. This result supports the hypothesis that intraﬁrm trade plays a role in the determination
of aggregate export price indices. More importantly, this suggests that intraﬁrm trade may play
a role in insulating multinationals from exchange rate movements.
Our ﬁndings also are important for future research on the role of the multinational corpo-
ration in both advanced and developing economies. The sizable gap in prices may be playing
an unobserved role in the perceived performance advantage of multinational ﬁrms both at home
and abroad.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 21
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A Appendix - Parameters for the Numerical Model
Parameters for the baseline model are:
• Qal =1 0 0 0− 5Sal
• Qf = 1000 − 5Sf
• τ =0 .05
• th =0 .35
• tf =0 .20
• c =5 0
• e =1
• θ =0 .0005
B Appendix - The Export Customs Form
Figure 4 displays the Shipper’s Export Declaration (SED) form that accompanies each export
transaction in the United States. As noted in the guidelines for ﬁlling out this form posted on
the web48:
• A separate SED is required for each shipment per U.S. Principal Party of Interest (USPPI),
including each rail car, truck, ocean vessel, airplane, or other vehicle.
• A shipment is deﬁned as all merchandise sent from one USPPI to one foreign consignee,
to a single foreign country of ultimate destination, on a single carrier, on the same day.
• Where two or more items are classiﬁed under the same Harmonized System product code,
the product code appears only once on the SED with a single quantity, shipping weight,
and value, unless a validated license requires otherwise or the shipment consists of a com-
bination of foreign and domestic merchandise classiﬁed under the same product code.
• Shipments involving multiple invoices or packages must be reported on the same SED.
48See http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/regulations/forms/correct-way-to-complete-the-sed.pdf.Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 25
Two-Digit HS Category 1993 2000 1993 2000
01-05 Animal & Animal Products 340 0.121 0.087 0.017 0.013 87
06-15 Vegetable Products 495 0.152 0.167 0.055 0.032 56
16-24 Foodstuffs 402 0.312 0.226 0.038 0.030 134
25-27 Mineral Products 211 0.140 0.157 0.028 0.016 51
28-38 Chemicals & Allied Industries 1,079 0.427 0.444 0.090 0.110 45
39-40 Plastics / Rubbers 281 0.461 0.385 0.038 0.044 61
41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & Furs 107 0.106 0.152 0.005 0.040 53
44-49 Wood & Wood Products 447 0.228 0.200 0.042 0.030 58
50-63 Textiles 1,168 0.251 0.252 0.027 0.025 66
64-67 Footwear / Headgear 91 0.247 0.249 0.002 0.001 60
68-71 Stone / Glass 261 0.317 0.161 0.039 0.021 56
72-83 Metals 804 0.284 0.265 0.034 0.035 54
84-85 Machinery / Electrical 1,983 0.465 0.336 0.346 0.409 49
86-89 Transportation 283 0.271 0.391 0.156 0.140 64
90-97 Miscellaneous 607 0.386 0.297 0.074 0.081 59




Notes: First column reports the number of ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) exports products in 2000 by two-digit
prefixes; they total to 8,572. Second and third columns report the share of related-party activity by two-digit categories
and the the share of that product category in total U.S. exports.exports, by year. Fourth column reports the mean high
minus low tariff rate in percentage points across products in the noted two-digit HS categories.
Number of 
Products
Related-Party Share Share of U.S. Exports
Table 1: Exports and Related-Party Exports by Two-Digit HS CategoryrTransfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 26
Country WTD BEA Country WTD BEA Country WTD BEA
Albania 30 . Germany 45 16 Pakistan 45 .
Angola 40 . Ghana 35 . Panama 30 15
Antigua 40 . Greece 40 27 Papua New Guinea 25 .
Argentina 35 30 Guatemala 30 . Paraguay 30 .
Armenia 25 . Guinea 35 . Peru 30 21
Australia 34 17 Guyana 45 . Philippines 32 13
Austria 34 17 Haiti 35 . Poland 28 29
Azerbaijan 32 . Honduras 25 22 Portugal 32 19
Bahamas 0 . Hong Kong 16 8 Qatar 35 .
Bahrain 0 . Hungary 18 10 Romania 38 .
Bangladesh 40 . Iceland 30 . Russia 35 .
Barbados 40 10 India 35 24 Saudi Arabia 45 13
Belarus 30 . Indonesia 30 37 Senegal 35 .
Belgium 39 12 Iran 54 . Sierra Leone 45 .
Belize 35 . Ireland 24 7 Singapore 26 6
Bermuda 0 3 Israel 36 10 Slovakia 40 .
Bolivia 25 . Israel 36 10 Slovenia 25 .
Botswana 25 . Italy 37 24 South Africa 30 14
Brazil 15 9 Ivory Coast 35 . South Korea 28 18
British Virgin Islands 15 . Jamaica 33 . Spain 35 14
Bulgaria 30 . Japan 30 32 Sri Lanka 35 .
Burma 30 . Jordan 35 . Sudan 40 .
Cambodia 20 . Kazakhstan 30 . Suriname 38 .
Cameroon 39 . Kenya 30 . Swaziland 38 .
Canada 38 24 Kyrgyzstan 30 . Sweden 28 10
Cayman Islands 0 . Latvia 25 . Switzerland 32 5
Chile 15 10 Lebanon 10 . Tanzania 30 .
China (Mainland) 30 14 Lesotho 35 . Thailand 30 21
China (Taiwan) 25 19 Libya 35 . The Gambia 35 .
Colombia 35 25 Liechtenstein 15 . Trinidad And Tobago 35 .
Costa Rica 30 16 Lithuania 29 . Tunisia 35 .
Croatia 35 . Luxembourg 30 2 Turkey 30 24
Cyprus 25 . Macao 15 . Uganda 30 .
Czech Republic 35 19 Malawi 38 . Ukraine 30 .
Denmark 32 5 Malaysia 28 19 United Kingdom 30 17
Dominican Republic 25 7 Malta And Gozo 35 . Uruguay 30 .
Ecuador 25 31 Mauritius 35 . Uzbekistan 33 .
Egypt 40 14 Mexico 35 19 Vanuatu 0 .
El Salvador 25 . Monaco 33 . Venezuela 34 16
Estonia 26 . Morocco 35 . Vietnam 32 .
Ethiopia 40 . Mozambique 35 . Virgin Islands 39 .
Ethiopia 40 . Namibia 35 . Western Samoa 39 .
Fiji 35 . Netherlands 35 7 Yemen Arab Republic 35 .
Finland 29 19 New Zealand 33 13 Zambia 35 .
France 33 19 Nigeria 30 58 Zimbabwe 35 .
Gabon 35 . Norway 28 59
Georgia 20 . Oman 30 .
Table reports maximum statutory corporate tax rate (WTD) from the Michigan World Tax Database and
the effective tax rate (BEA) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for each country in 2000. 
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Bins Within Which Arm's Length Prices Are Averaged Mean Std Dev
Within product, month 1.92 2.42
Within product, month, country 1.22 2.26
Within product, month, country, transport mode 1.13 2.20
Within product, month, country, transport mode, firm 0.43 1.77
Notes: Table displays mean and standard deviation of log difference of firms
arm's length and related party unit values. Each row reports statistics for
successively more refined bins for comparing arm's length and related party
prices. The set of observations related party observations used in each row
(3,980,529) is held constant. 




Rauch      
Liberal
Commodity Goods 0.088 0.176 0.124
0.671 1.096 0.743
Differentiated Goods 0.667 0.528 0.530
2.229 1.953 1.977
Notes: Table reports mean and standard deviation of log difference in firms' 
arm's length and related party prices by product type. Standard deviations
are reported below each mean. Three methods are used to distinguish
commodities from differentiated products. The first uses two-digit
Harmonized System categories: commodies are HS categories 1 to 21 and
25 to 29 while differentiated prodducts are HS categories 84-97. The
second and third methods use the conservative and liberal definitions of
differentiated goods from Rauch(1999). Reported statistics are based on
the full sample of 3,980,529 related party observations.
Method for Assessing Product Differentiation
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Tax Rate (WTD) -4.178 *** -1.638 ***
0.665 0.447
Tax Rate (BEA) -1.679 *** -0.548 **
0.580 0.213





Note: Table reports OLS regression results of the log difference in firms' arm's length and related party
prices on noted covariates. Standard errors are robust to clustering (country-year for both types of tax
rates, product-country-year in for tariff rates). Constant is suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
Price    
Wedge
No Product No Product No Product
Price    
Wedge
Price    
Wedge
Price    
Wedge
0.17
Price    
Wedge
Price    
Wedge
0.00 0.16
3,585,777 3,585,777 2,601,981 2,601,981 1,673,133 1,673,133
0.00 0.15 0.00
Table 5: Country Characteristics and the Price WedgeTransfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 30
Ln Employment 0.010 ***
0.001





Tax Rate (WTD) -0.664 *** -0.664 *** -0.559 ***
0.045 0.045 0.045











Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of log difference in firms'
arm's length and related party prices on noted covariates. Tax rate is the
statutory maximum rate from the Michigan World Tax Database. Robust
standard errors noted below each coefficient. Coefficients for product
fixed effects are suppressed. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
a Coefficien
and standard errors for exporters per product-country have been
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Exporters per Product-Country (000) -0.346 *** -0.369 ***
0.022 0.022
Tax Rate (WTD) -0.646 ***
0.048
Tax Rate (BEA) -0.391 ***
0.030
Tariff Rate 0.662 *** 0.645 ***
0.023 0.024





Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of log difference in
firms' arm's length and related party prices on noted covariates.
First tax rate is the statutory maximum rate from the Michigan
World Tax Database. Second tax rates is the effective tax rate
according to BEA data. Robust standard errors noted below each
coefficient. Coefficients for product fixed effects as well as
regression constant are suppressed. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. Long-run real exchange rate elasticity is the
percent change in the wedge induced by a permanent one-
percent appreciation of the dollar.  
Product






Table 7: Exchange Rates and the Price WedgeTransfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 32
Exporters per Product-Country (000) -0.495 *** -0.524 *** -0.234 *** -0.429 *** -0.324 *** -0.345 ***
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022
Tax Rate (WTD) -0.768 *** -3.962 *** -0.748 ***
0.044 0.049 0.060
Tax Rate (BEA) -0.433 *** -1.455 *** -0.391 ***
0.027 0.030 0.030
Tariff Rate 0.753 *** 0.742 *** 0.129 *** 0.284 *** 0.673 *** 0.604 ***
0.022 0.023 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.025
Ln RERm -0.088 *** -0.058 *** 0.106 *** 0.112 *** -0.222 *** -0.206 ***
0.019 0.004 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021














Price Wedge Price Wedge
0.17 0.17
Product Product
0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Product Product
Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of log difference in firms' arm's length and related party prices on noted
covariates. First tax rate is the statutory maximum rate from the Michigan World Tax Database. Second tax rates is the
effective tax rate according to BEA data. Columns one through four use alternate price wedges as defined in the text.
Robust standard errors noted below each coefficient. Coefficients for product fixed effects as well as regression constant
are suppressed. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Long-run real
exchange rate elasticity is the percent change in the wedge induced by a permanent one-percent appreciation of the
dollar.  
1,567,401 1,567,401 1,567,401 1,567,401 1,567,401 1,567,401
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WTD
Selected Countries Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Tax Rate (%)
Total Exports
a 728,362 89 218,688 30 478,301 65.7
Argentina 3,022 0.4 621 20.5 2,263 74.9 35 0 0
Brazil 12,462 1.5 2,483 19.9 9,688 77.7 15 321 112
Canada 164,347 20.1 69,029 42 82,665 50.3 38 (1,338) (468)
Chile 3,236 0.4 365 11.3 2,735 84.5 16 45 16
China 32,606 4 4,616 14.2 27,693 84.9 30 149 52
Colombia 4,145 0.5 528 12.7 3,415 82.4 35 0 0
France 19,626 2.4 6,246 31.8 12,837 65.4 33.3 69 24
Germany 27,223 3.3 8,778 32.2 17,692 65 25 567 198
Hong Kong 11,984 1.5 1,692 14.1 9,953 83.1 16 208 73
Ireland 7,615 0.9 2,361 31 5,047 66.3 16 290 101
Japan 50,493 6.2 16,200 32.1 33,513 66.4 30 523 183
Korea 24,994 3.1 3,538 14.2 21,142 84.6 27 183 64
Mexico 93,018 11.4 38,602 41.5 48,996 52.7 35 0 0
Netherlands 22,462 2.7 8,064 35.9 13,988 62.3 34.5 26 9
Singapore 17,850 2.2 5,332 29.9 12,046 67.5 24.5 362 127
Taiwan 20,343 2.5 3,333 16.4 16,597 81.6 25 215 75
United Kingdom 31,734 3.9 8,803 27.7 21,859 68.9 30 284 100
Total - Selected Countries 547,160 75 180,591 83 342,129 72 1,904 666
WTD
Selected Countries Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Tax Rate (%)
Total Imports 1,460,160 100 697,561 47.8 724,028 49.6
Argentina 3,772 0.3 1,103 29.2 2,656 70.4 35 0 0
Brazil 21,098 1.4 7,026 33.3 14,012 66.4 15 908 318
Canada 255,660 17.5 116,261 45.5 113,429 44.4 38 (2,253) (789)
Chile 5,007 0.3 982 19.6 4,004 80 16 121 42
China 196,160 13.4 53,172 27.1 141,288 72 30 1,717 601
Colombia 7,361 0.5 997 13.5 6,052 82.2 35 0 0
France 31,505 2.2 15,394 48.9 15,652 49.7 33.3 169 59
Germany 75,622 5.2 46,959 62.1 27,103 35.8 25 3,034 1,062
Hong Kong 9,241 0.6 1,244 13.5 7,901 85.5 16 153 53
Ireland 27,401 1.9 24,480 89.3 2,696 9.8 16 3,005 1,052
Japan 129,535 8.9 102,207 78.9 25,803 19.9 30 3,301 1,155
Korea 45,064 3.1 28,091 62.3 16,748 37.2 27 1,452 508
Mexico 154,959 10.6 94,716 61.1 58,408 37.7 35 0 0
Netherlands 12,471 0.9 6,652 53.3 5,589 44.8 34.5 21 8
Singapore 14,848 1 11,082 74.6 3,637 24.5 24.5 752 263
Taiwan 34,462 2.4 8,254 24 25,779 74.8 25 533 187
United Kingdom 45,920 3.1 26,863 58.5 18,161 39.6 30 868 304





Note: Values in millions of U.S. dollars. AL=arm's length and RP=related party. Trade Data Sources: http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/Press-Release/2004pr/aip/rp04-exh-2.pdf (exports); http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2004pr/aip/rp04-exh-1.pdf 
(imports);  http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm (tax rates). Related-party and arms-length exports (imports) do not sum to 
total exports (imports) as 4.3 percent of exports (2.3 percent of imports) do not have a record of the related-party status. Estimates of trade 
changes and tax losses are calculated using the point estimate from Table 7, column1.  
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Figure 2: U.S. Exports by Multinationals and Arms-Length Exporters in 2000Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 35
Prices vs Import Tariff
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Prices vs Foreign Tax Rate
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Figure 3: Numerical Solution of the Price Wedge as a Function of Model ParametersTransfer Pricing by Multinational Firms 36
Figure 4: Shipper’s Export Declaration Form